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Patent quality is an international priority
2
“Only high-quality patents and processes 
serve the needs of inventors, innovation 
and society alike”
- EPO Annual Report 2014
"I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the 
things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those 
which are not.“ – Thomas Jefferson, 1813
3
The difficulty in ensuring patent quality are 
not new
4But recent developments highlight the cost 
of low-quality patents
5And the question of when and how broadly 
quality filters should be applied
Stage of Patent 
Lifecycle
Quality Mechanisms
Pre-Application Legal requirements, fees, quality of 
submission, third-party submissions
Pre-Grant Prosecution levers
Post-Grant Post-Grant Procedures, Reissue, 
Reexam, Maintenance Fees
This presentation applies a comparative lens 
to patent quality
6
Bearing in mind that there are many differences 
between the European and US systems…
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Factor US Europe
Examiner Pay US civil service grades Double US levels, 
limited taxes
Examiner Turnover ~33% per year 5% per year
Bifurcation of Search 
& Examination 
No Yes
Loser Pays No Yes
Sources: Drahos (2010), van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2011), Temmerman (2013), 
EPO, USPTO 2015 
“And the wisdom to know the difference…”
This presentation considers US and EP ouctomes
at aggregate and “matched pair” levels
8
- “Exact match” matched pair approach for prosecution outcomes 
(Graham & Harhoff, 2006). Filing date / priority date matches.
- Data sources: Innography, Lex Machina, PATSTAT, Google Patents, 
WIPO/Schmcoch, NSF, PTO/EPO
- Related work: Jensen, et al. (2005, 2007, 2008 2011, 2014), Graham 
& Harhoff (2006, 2009), Wright (2009), Sampat et al. (2015)
Exact 
Match
The quantity and quality of patents in force is 
the result of three sets of decisions
9
Patents in Force
Patent Application
x
Patent 
Examination
x
Patent Renewal
Each is influenced by doctrinal, institutional, 
economic, and market factors
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Patents in Force
Patent Application
x
Patent 
Examination
x
Patent Renewal
Comparing the US and EP at each of these 
stages…
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US PATENTS 
(FILED 2002)
EPO PATENTS 
(FILED 2002)
Sources: PATSTAT 2015 (application and grant numbers), Trilateral 
Statistics 2002 Report (projected renewal rates).
273K US 
applications
x
74% grant rate
x
37% projected* 
Y20 renewal rate 
75K US 
patents in 
force in Y20
120K EPO 
applications
x
50% grant rate
x
12% projected* 
Y20 renewal rate 
6.9K EPO 
patents in 
force in Y20
EPO v. US PATENTS 
(2002)
2.3 x applications
x
1.5 x grant rate 
x
3x renewal rate
10x more US 
patents in 
force than EPO
At each stage, the US tilts towards more 
quantity – ex: 2002 
EPO v. US Patents
(Tech* 2002)
3.0 x 
applications
x
1.8 x grant rate 
x
3x renewal rate
17x more US 
tech patents in 
force than EPO
EPO v. US PATENTS 
(2013)
3.8 x 
applications
x
1.8 x grant rate 
x
2x renewal rate
14x more US 
patents in force 
than EPO
2.3 x 
applications
x
1.5 x grant rate 
x
3x renewal rate
10x more US 
patents in force 
than EPO
Sources: PATSTAT 2015 (application and grant numbers), Trilateral Statistics 
2002 Report (projected renewal rates).*“Electrical Engineering” patents as defined 
by WIPO/Schmoch
EPO v. US PATENTS 
(2002)
The disparities are greatest in tech, and 
growing
What explains the differences in 
applications? 
EPO v. US PATENTS 
(2002)
2.3 x applications
x
1.5 x grant rate 
x
3x renewal rate
10x more US 
patents in 
force than EPO
The EPO did not experience the same surge in 
tech patenting that the US did
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FIG__: R&D (in $M) per US Origin Patent Application
1980-2007 (inflation adjusted)
Chemicals Electrical Equipment and Computers
Source: NSF, USPTO via PATSTAT 2015, Lybbert and Zolas 2013 
What has driven the surge in US tech patents? 
Defensive/FTO driven patenting is likely one factor 
- Relative value of US v. EU patents
- Scope of patentability 
- Size, importance of US v. EU markets 
- Loser pays in EU, overall enforcement 
climate
Other factors that contribute to the differences
What explains the differences in grants? 
EPO v. US PATENTS 
(2002)
2.3 x applications
x
1.5 x grant rate 
x
3x renewal rate
10x more US 
patents in 
force than EPO
Across categories US patents are more likely to be 
issued than EPO patents, on the same applications
68%
76%
75%
82%
52%
43%
53%
66%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Chemistry
Electrical engineering
Instruments
Mechanical engineering
Comparative Patent Grant Rates
(September 2002 ~7K Matched Patent Applications)*
EPO US
*Matched on priority date. Source: PATSTAT 2015, Innography 2015. Accord, 
Jensen et al 2008, Graham & Harhoff, 2009
The majority
of nongranted
apps in the EPO 
are withdrawn, 
not refused
13%
81%
6%
FIG ___The Resolution of Non-Granted 
European Patent Applications (N= 3,517 
2002 Matched Pairs)
Pending Withdrawn Refused
EPO’s lower grant rate is due to higher 
applicant withdrawal rates (not refusals)
Less than half of IPRed US patents* that were filed for in 
Europe have actually been granted in Europe… with many 
of the remainder withdrawn…
100%
47%
20%
31%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
US EPO
Comparative Examination and IPR Outcomes 
N = 169 Matched US Patent-EPO Applications* 
Granted Denied Withdrawn Pending
*IPRed patents that have been the subject of a final decision as of June 2015.
Source: Lex Machina, Innography
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The ‘137 DataTreasury patent was the subject of 7 EP 
Applications, none of which matured into a patent 
44%
20%
34%
29%
50%
59%
14%
6%
11%
6%
13%
27%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Average All
Other fields
Instruments
Mechanical engineering
Electrical engineering
Chemistry
FIG___: US v. EPO Examiner Use of Non-Patent 
Literature (~7K 2002 Matched App Pairs)
US  Examiner-cited NPL EPO Examiner-cited NPL
Source: EP Register 2015, USPTO PAIR 2015, Google Patents (Front Page 
information) 
EPO examiners are more likely to cite non-
patent literature (NPL)
Google Patents, 2015 Edition:
Sources of Data
Why does EP have high satisfaction even 
with relatively lower grant rate?
25
The majority
of nongranted
apps in the EPO 
are withdrawn, 
not refused
13%
81%
6%
FIG ___The Resolution of Non-Granted 
European Patent Applications (N= 3,517 
2002 Matched Pairs)
Pending Withdrawn Refused
EPO’s lower grant rate is due to higher 
applicant withdrawal rates (not refusals)
“In the EPO,  patents are granted in 49% of total filings, 
with 22% of applications abandoned after the search report 
and 29% abandoned after examination.”
- EPO President Battistelli at the 30th Annual US Bar- EPO 
Liaison Council Meeting, 10/30/2014
What makes EPO applicants withdraw? 
EPO conducts a single search, invests in quality 
upfront. PTO is more tolerant, allows refilings
Can refile
through
continuations
No 
continuations
While time for searching prior art varies, EP prior art searching take ~8-12 avg., 
vs. ~2 hours on average at the PTO (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2011), EPO)
Jefferson was “quite favorable to the granting of patents, 
and granted them with great consideration, the other duties 
of members of this Board, in view of their high offices, made 
it impossible for them to devote much time to this work. As a 
result the law was changed in 1793 to make the granting of 
patents a clerical function.” – PJ Frederico, 1952
Time pressure during examination is nothing new
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What explains the difference in renewal 
rates? 
US Patents may be more valuable – they are 
also cheaper and easier to renew
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Patent Costs Relative to Market Size
(Total Fees per $B GDP) 
Source: Park, On Patenting Costs, 2010, updated to 2014 data 
Stepping back…
Should we worry about quality for every patent? 
When is the right time?
Sorting between patents that matter and patents 
that don’t
Stage of Patent 
Lifecycle
Quality Mechanisms
Pre-Application Legal requirements, fees, quality of 
submission, third-party submissions
Pre-Grant Prosecution levers
Post-Grant Post-Grant Procedures, Reissue, 
Reexam, Maintenance Fees
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Who should decide?
Quality
Mechanisms
Third Parties Patentees?
Post Grant Post Grant
Procedures
Sorting between patents that are likely to be 
enforced and those that aren’t
35
My proposal to enhance quality: reward patentees for 
designating patents as defensive only or available for 
FRAND-licensing
Quality
Mechanisms
Third Parties Patentees?
Post Grant Post Grant
Procedures
Defensive 
only/FRAND-
friendly patent 
option
Sorting between patents that are likely to be 
enforced and those that aren’t
Facilitating “Defensive Only” / “FRAND” friendly patent 
options 
Sources: 
Chien, Exclusionary and 
Diffusionary Levers in 
Patent Law, 2015
Chien, Why Its Time to 
Open the Patent System, 
2015. 
- Patentee can elect at any time to make patent “defensive” or 
available on FRAND and in return, get a 50% discount on fees
- Once a patent becomes defensive, must remain defensive
- Demand expressed in the marketplace through proliferation 
of defensive pledges: OIN, DPL, LOT, Tesla, many others
- Companies that go defensive will reduce their own costs 
and costs of entry/patenting for startups 
- Akin to DE/UK License of Right
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